"In Abundance of Counsellors there Is Victory": Reasoning about Public Policy from a Religious Worldview by Dormandy, Katherine
1 
 
                               
                               
     
 
Chapter 9: “In Abundance of Counsellors There is Victory”1:  
Reasoning about Public Policy from a Religious Worldview 
 
Katherine Dormandy 
 
 
[in: Religious Truth and Identity in an Age of Plurality,  
eds. Oliver Wiertz and Peter Jonkers, London: Routledge (2020), 162-181.] 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Some religious communities argue that public policy is best decided by their own members, 
on the grounds that collaborating with those reasoning from secular or “worldly” perspectives 
will only foment error about how society should be run. But I argue that epistemology instead 
recommends fostering disagreement among a plurality of religious and secular worldviews. 
Inter-worldview disagreement over public policy can challenge our unquestioned 
assumptions, deliver evidence we would likely have missed, and expose us to new epistemic 
alternatives; when done respectfully, it can also combat epistemically problematic biases and 
groupthink. I address two objections that members of a politically active religious community 
might raise: one that inter-worldview disagreement about public policy is not needed because 
one’s own beliefs are already true, and another that it is not needed because one’s own belief-
forming processes are divinely guided.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Religious communities are often active in the public sphere, aiming for influence in politics 
by getting their members and sympathizers elected to public office. Seeking to maximize 
one’s influence is part of the rough-and-tumble of politics in a democracy. But some religious 
communities pursue this aim not just for practical reasons, but also for epistemological ones. 
Their rationale is that their own religious worldview has a firm grasp on truths about right and 
wrong, whereas other viewpoints – prominently secular ones – neglect important values and 
so are likely to yield public policy that is mistaken, not least because it is morally 
impoverished.2  
 
One way to express this rationale is as the claim that certain sorts of discussion, dissent, or 
disagreement on public-policy matters should be suppressed, so that a particular viewpoint, 
one taken to be correct, can dominate.3 Expressed this way, the epistemic rationale of the 
religious communities that I have in mind butts up against a common tenet of scientific 
reasoning: that disagreement, far from being suppressed, should be actively encouraged.4 The 
idea is that lively disagreement from a diversity of perspectives promotes true beliefs and 
related epistemic goals, as differing viewpoints challenge and complement each other.  
 
Scientists claim this, of course, because they do not assume themselves to be in possession of 
the truth, and recognize that a measure of epistemic friction5 can spur them to improve their 
theories. But certain politically active religious communities will claim that, unlike scientists, 
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they know that their beliefs are true, and moreover that their reasoning is subject to divine 
guidance, so they do not stand to gain epistemically from engaging in disagreement, certainly 
not about public policy.6 
 
But I will argue that religious communities that take this view are mistaken. Even if their 
worldview is largely on track, they nonetheless stand to gain epistemically by engaging in 
disagreement about public policy with adherents of different large-scale worldviews, 
including secular ones.  
 
I will call this sort of disagreement foundational-worldview disagreement. The situation I 
have in mind is something like this: Community 1 adheres to large-scale belief system B, 
from which it reasons to the policy recommendation P. Community 2, by contrast, adheres to 
large-scale belief system B*, which is incompatible (in some significant way) with B and 
from which it reasons to public-policy recommendation not-P. A familiar contemporary 
example is the debate over abortion rights, where religious communities often argue on 
religious grounds that it should be illegal, and secular communities on secular grounds that 
abortion should be allowed. 
 
My claim can be summarized as follows: 
 
The plural-discourse claim: Engaging in foundational-worldview disagreement over 
public policy has the strong potential to yield epistemic benefits on public-policy matters. 
 
By “engaging in disagreement” I mean open-mindedly discussing public policy in a way that 
enables you to understand and critique your interlocutor’s view and him to understand and 
critique yours.7 
 
The plural-discourse claim does not say that that foundational-worldview disagreement is 
always epistemically beneficial. On the contrary, sometimes it will be of little use, for 
example if the foundational worldview of one’s interlocutor is epistemically or morally 
beyond the pale – think of white supremacists or flat-earthers.8 (Indeed, scientists limit their 
claims about the benefits of scientific disagreement too, to those with the requisite training.) 
What the plural-discourse claim says is just that, such cases aside, we stand to learn much 
about the right public policy for our society from people who disagree with us about it, even – 
or perhaps especially – when their disagreements stem from fundamental differences between 
our religious or secular worldviews. As a result, restrictions on the worldviews used in public-
policy reasoning will typically (with a few exceptions) come with an epistemic cost. Even if a 
politically active religious community were to gain a big enough majority that they could 
legislate as they pleased, they would do well, from an epistemic point of view, to invite 
disagreement with adherents of other foundational worldviews.  
 
My argument for the plural-discourse claim will initially take an a fortiori form: I will argue 
that disagreement in general yields epistemic benefits, and thus that so does foundational-
worldview disagreement about public policy. I will then address two objections that a 
politically active religious community of the sort I have in mind might make, each to the 
effect that their community poses an exception (section 3). The first objection (section 4) 
arises from the claim that their worldview beliefs are true, and the second (section 5) from the 
claim that they are guided by divine cognitive influence. Even if the community is right about 
both of these things, I will argue, the plural-discourse claim applies. 
 
I will start (section 2) with some setup. 
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Public-Policy Reasoning and Disagreement 
 
Each person has an interlocking network of beliefs, concepts, and values that I will call her 
belief system. Belief systems have subsets that pertain to different domains, and that relate to 
other subsets in complex causal, psychological, logical, and epistemic ways.9 Many people’s 
belief systems contain a subset comprising a foundational worldview, such as a religious or 
secular stance; and many contain, similarly, a subset pertaining to matters of public policy. I 
will be discussing how these subsets relate epistemically – in particular when it comes to 
using the resources of foundational worldviews to reason about public policy.   
 
Public-policy reasoning centres around two types of question. What I’ll call the question of 
ends concerns which public ends (e.g. income parity, poverty reduction, etc.) are the best to 
promote in the situation at hand, all things considered. The question of means concerns which 
policies are the best suited to realizing these ends. The latter question must take account of 
not only the causal efficacy of a given policy with respect to desired ends, but also the values 
and disvalues incurred by the policy itself. Public-policy reasoning, like reasoning of any sort, 
is done by situated agents within the context of their own belief systems. It will be useful to 
say more about the three elements – beliefs, concepts, and values – that these involve; I will 
do so by illustrating them as they might arise in belief systems about public policy, though 
similar remarks apply to religious belief systems.10  
 
Beliefs about public policy concern the ends and means at issue, as well as any auxiliary 
matters needed to think about them – including what epistemic standards to use in evaluating 
the belief system itself. Beliefs bear all manner of epistemic relations to each other, such as 
entailing, making probable, supporting, and the like.  
 
Second, belief systems contain concepts. These are the building blocks for beliefs. Consider 
the belief that it is good to increase income equality. What this belief means depends on the 
particular concept of (or measure for) income equality that is at issue, as well as on the 
underlying notion of goodness.  
 
Third, public-policy reasoning involves values: the placing of things in preference orderings 
by some measure of importance, perhaps including, but not limited to, their moral goodness. 
Values determine our public-policy ends: Do we value the reduction of income inequality 
more than the reduction of the national deficit, or vice versa? Values also help determine our 
beliefs about which means are best suited for bringing those ends about. For example, of two 
policies conducive to reducing income inequality, which brings more good and less bad into 
the world on balance? (Values also determine the concepts of “good” that we favour.) In 
addition to determining what beliefs we hold about ends and means and how we 
conceptualize them, values determine the topics on which we form beliefs and concepts to 
begin with. For it is our values that prompt us to care enough about a matter to articulate 
beliefs and concepts to describe it.  
 
Beliefs, concepts, and values – about public policy and other matters – are subject to 
epistemic evaluation, and thus (if needed) to epistemic improvement. Beliefs can be true or 
false, epistemically justified, probable or improbable.11 Concepts can be accurate, or – if they 
aim to designate one aspect of a complex phenomenon to make it tractable – useful. Values 
too, at least if they track mind-independent goods, can be accurate or inaccurate; they can also 
be epistemically revealing or concealing, depending on which matters they prompt us to look 
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into or ignore. I will use the term accurate to describe a belief system whose beliefs, 
concepts, and values are epistemically good (or useful) in these ways.12 We can understand 
the plural-discourse claim as saying that foundational-worldview disagreement can improve 
the accuracy of belief systems on matters of public policy. 
 
But what does accuracy with respect to public policy amount to? Very roughly, an accurate 
public-policy belief system is one that reflects a public policy that would meet the needs of 
people in the society across a plurality of social locations, such as income groups, ethnicities, 
religious or secular groupings, genders, and so forth. That is, it contains largely true beliefs – 
about what these needs are, which ends to pursue in order to meet them, and which means are 
best suited in the circumstances to achieving those ends (taking into account any disvalue 
incurred by the means themselves); and it contains concepts suitable for articulating those 
needs, ends, and means; as well as values that prioritize them. Given the manifold needs in a 
pluralistic society, there typically will not be a single optimal public-policy outcome, but 
rather several equally good possible outcomes. We may call the search for the best policy the 
search for an optimal outcome. Figuring out an optimal outcome is what I’ll call the epistemic 
aim of public-policy reasoning.  
 
There are three things that are subject to disagreement in this context. The first and most 
straightforward (because at least partly subject to empirical study) is which means are best for 
achieving certain ends. Second, there is the matter of disagreeing over which ends themselves 
to prioritize for the sake of meeting a plurality of needs; this question is less straightforward 
because of the role of values in determining the answer. Third, disagreement will concern 
what various segments of the population need to begin with. This too is not always a 
straightforward matter; a noteworthy feature of some religious belief systems is that they 
contain beliefs about what various segments of the population need that differ from what 
those parties take themselves to need. For example, a religious belief system might hold that 
people need to be saved from sinking too low into debauchery as the religious community 
construes it, whereas the people themselves might disagree about which behaviours constitute 
debauchery, or they might agree but think that they need the freedom to sink into it if they 
choose.13 
 
With this background on belief systems (including on public policy), I’ll argue that 
disagreement in general can yield epistemic benefits. I’ll then respond to objections to the 
effect that foundational-worldview disagreement, including about public policy, is an 
exception.  
 
The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement in General 
 
This section argues that disagreement is epistemically beneficial, including when it pertains to 
emotive matters like religion and public policy. It starts by defending the benefits of 
disagreement in general, then zeroes in on some distinguishing features of disagreement about 
emotive matters like religion and public policy.14 
 
What Shapes Belief Systems 
 
My argument for the plural-discourse claim is premised on a picture of what influences our 
belief systems. I will discuss three salient factors. The first is evidence, which (as I understand 
it) consists in a person’s representational experiences and her justified beliefs.15 Evidence is a 
causal but also a normative influence on her beliefs. It can help build her concept of a thing, 
and it influences what she values and disvalues. 
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Second are psychological influences. These include affective states, which generate affective 
biases (e.g., fear of spiders generates a bias against spiders, a feeling of belonging generates a 
bias toward in-group members); and cognitive states, which generate cognitive or intellectual 
biases (e.g., we prefer our own data and experiences over other people’s).16  
 
Finally, social influences include the stereotypes and biases that are prevalent in our 
community or society – say, in the media or the going forms of humour, as well as 
interpersonal pressures to believe in accord with our friends or co-workers.17 
 
Psychological and social factors can influence a person’s reasoning directly, just by causing 
beliefs, concepts, or values. They also do so indirectly, operating through her experiential 
evidence. They influence, first, what she attends to or ignores;18 and second, how she 
perceives things when she does attend to them – for example, because she loves her brother, 
she may perceive people who resemble him as kind.19 Third, these factors influence how a 
person evaluates evidence: for example, whether she draws the simple but limited conclusion 
or the complex but explanatorily broad one, whether she believes or disbelieve a given 
person’s testimony, and so forth.20 
 
Each influence on our reasoning can promote or impede accuracy. Evidence for its part is 
supposed to promote true beliefs. In many cases it does – but whether it does depends on 
whether the psychological and social factors that influence your evidence and evidence-
evaluation are themselves sensitive to the truth in the case at hand.  
 
Many such factors are not truth-sensitive.21 Some are sensitive to other concerns, such as 
prolonging our survival. For example, we might be strongly biased to believe, of any snake, 
that it is poisonous, even if this is statistically highly unlikely. For another example, a 
tendency to believe the testimony of in-group members and disbelieve outsiders may once 
have been a similar, exaggerated, safety mechanism, even if it is today largely outdated. Even 
many so-called “epistemic values”, such as a preference for simplicity over explanatory 
breadth, are not truth-sensitive as such, but are rather a priori preferences.22  
 
That said, other influences on our belief systems are truth-sensitive; experts, for example, 
develop perceptual sensitivities from years of training. But even if an influence is truth-
sensitive, it is highly unlikely to be perfectly responsive to the way things are. Experts can 
even commit certain errors because of their expertise. A dietician may be biased toward 
nutritional explanations, whereas cardiologists may favour cardiological ones. So even truth-
sensitive influences are prone to yielding certain sorts of false belief. I call a false belief 
brought about by an otherwise truth-sensitive influence a false-positive belief.23 
 
A salient social influence is the tendency of group members to engage in groupthink: to 
conform their reasoning to the thought patterns of their whole group.24 Groupthink is not 
truth-sensitive as such, though if the group’s thought is truth-sensitive, it can be. But even 
then, groupthink can cause false-positive beliefs. Imagine for example that France reports a 
comparatively large proportion of gout sufferers, whereas Germany reports statistically 
excessive hypothyroidism – yet other indicators would predict similar proportions of each. 
Groupthink in the medical professions of the respective countries might be the culprit. 
 
The three influences on our beliefs (i.e., evidence, psychological factors, and social ones) are 
often implicit, occurring below our fully conscious awareness.25 This can hold even of 
evidence: although this is understood to be available on sufficient reflection,26 there are many 
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questions for which we have too much evidence to reflect on all at once, and there are many 
questions for which we never try.27 This means that we are often unaware of what causes or 
justifies our beliefs, concepts, and values. Many of the influences in question may not be 
truth-sensitive, whereas others may be truth-sensitive but nonetheless prone to generating 
false-positive beliefs. 
 
Two Epistemic Worries Mitigated by Foundational-Worldview Disagreement 
 
The considerations just discussed yield three epistemic concerns, including but not limited to 
matters of public policy, for those with limited exposure outside of their epistemic 
community.28 
 
According to the circularity worry, a group of like-minded people conversing only with each 
other is badly placed to epistemically evaluate its own belief system:29 members will be 
strongly disposed to give it a thumbs-up regardless. One reason is that they will carry out any 
such evaluation by the standards of their own belief system, which will be biased to self-
favour. Another is that groupthink tendencies ensure that most individual group members 
exhibit the same thought patterns, and so will be ill-equipped to offer independent criticism.  
 
The distortion worry says that a group’s belief system is prone to misrepresent some aspects 
of reality. First, truth-insensitive influences are apt to be in place. Second, even truth-sensitive 
influences are likely to generate certain false-positive beliefs. Third, the circularity just 
observed hinders group members from seeing these distortions.  
 
Foundational-worldview disagreement can help mitigate these worries, in three ways.30 First, 
it can provide constructive external criticism of your belief system. A disagreeing outsider is 
well placed to notice implicit or unexamined foundational beliefs, concepts that miss 
important aspects of a phenomenon, or values that your belief system ignores. This helps 
mitigate the circularity worry, because it can alert us to aspects of our belief system that we 
took for granted and thus failed to evaluate, and it can provide a less sympathetic evaluation 
with which to triangulate our self-assessments. Of course, we will filter external criticism 
through our own beliefs, concepts, and values, but we will at least have more diverse data to 
run through the filter. As for the distortion worry, external criticism can provide clues about 
what our belief system may have missed or misconstrued, and in prompting us to nuance our 
belief systems it can rein in truth-insensitive biases and the false-positive effects of truth-
sensitive biases. Importantly, your interlocutor need not be in better epistemic shape than you 
in order for his constructive criticism to benefit you in these ways; he need only notice 
weaknesses in your belief system or its influences. 
 
Second, engaging in foundational-worldview disagreement can expand your evidential basis. 
It delivers evidence that someone disagrees with you, but more importantly, when you 
discourse at greater length, it informs you of the particular evidence supporting your 
interlocutor’s belief system. That evidence will tend to differ from yours in two respects: 
First, it will arise from different types of event than the ones that you have experienced (since 
your interlocutors will tend to travel in different social and cultural circles than you); and 
second, your interlocutor’s psychological and social influences will prime him to experience 
even similar events differently to you. The additional evidence provided by disagreement can 
help mitigate the circularity worry, for outsiders’ evidence can be harder for our belief system 
to accommodate than our own evidence, and so can challenge positive epistemic self-
evaluations. It can mitigate the distortion worry by supplementing our own evidence, which 
may be misleading because incomplete.  
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Third, engaging in foundational-worldview disagreement will provide epistemic alternatives: 
It can help you understand your interlocutors’ beliefs, concepts, and values, and it will 
acquaint you with their evidence and reasoning. It will thus open possibilities for how things 
could be different than your belief system represents them. This may be an antidote to your 
community’s groupthink, which narrows your space of possibilities. The provision of 
epistemic alternatives can mitigate the circularity worry, since alternatives can present other 
means of evaluation on which our own belief systems perform less well than on our own. And 
it can mitigate the distortion worry, since new epistemic alternatives can provide another way 
of reasoning that might complement, or be more fruitful than, the one that we have thus far 
been implementing by default.  
 
These three epistemic benefits – external criticism, additional evidence, and epistemic 
alternatives – are especially important in discussions of public policy. Recall that the 
epistemic aim of public-policy reasoning is to figure out an optimal outcome for meeting the 
needs of people across a plurality of social locations, which of course includes locations other 
than one’s own religious community. It is to be expected that the needs arising from one 
social location may be hard to recognize or understand from within others. In figuring out the 
right public policy for your society, then, it is crucial to seek external criticism of your public-
policy belief system, additional evidence drawn from the experiences and views of people in 
other social locations, and epistemic alternatives that might be occluded from your own social 
location, especially as these concern the public-policy needs of those very people.31  
 
A Third Epistemic Worry Mitigated by Foundational-Worldview Disagreement 
 
The circularity and distortion worries arise for our reasoning generally. But there is a third 
worry arising specifically for reasoning about existentially and personally important matters – 
including religion, public policy, and the application of the one to the other. The exacerbation 
worry, as I call it, says that, when we are reasoning about such topics, the circularity and 
distortion worries are worsened: We become less adept at evaluating our own belief systems 
negatively, and they are more susceptible to distortion.  
 
The reason is that thinking about such matters activates our psychological and community 
defences.32 Public policy tends to be of great practical relevance, and our foundational 
worldview creates an overall coherent picture of life and our place in it. We tend to feel 
frightened at the prospect of our belief systems on these matters being called into question. 
On top of this, we tend to identify with our religious (or secular) and political groups, and one 
way of signalling and policing belonging is by ensuring that one espouses the community 
belief system. When it comes to these matters, then, the social and psychological influences 
described above activate more strongly to protect our belief systems as they stand.33 
 
To see how, we need a brief glance at a key mechanism that gives rise to exacerbation. This 
mechanism is bias. A bias can be understood as a strong tendency to associate the object of 
your bias with some other object, concept, or emotion. A bias against alternative worldviews 
or public-policy belief systems manifests itself as a strong negative association with anything 
that represents that alternative to you, including the people who hold it. You perceive these 
things or people under a negative aspect, perhaps accompanied by negative emotions. This 
mode of perception in turn confirms and strengthens the bias itself, making you more apt next 
time round to have an even stronger negative perception or reaction when you consider 
alternative viewpoints or the people who hold them.34 
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I have said that foundational-worldview disagreement can mitigate the exacerbation worry. 
But this might appear to be exactly wrong: If we are primed for bias against things in seeming 
conflict with our own belief system, then surely a direct encounter with someone who 
disagrees with it will trigger our defensive biases and bring on exacerbation full throttle. 
 
We may agree that this is a danger in certain cases – but in others less so. What makes the 
difference? To answer this question, consider what it takes for a bias to be undone: The 
person who harbours it must come across enough counterinstances, i.e., things or persons 
who do not conform to it. In the case of foundational-worldview disagreement, a 
counterinstance would be an interlocutor who does not pose a threat to what she deeply 
believes and holds dear. What sorts of interlocutors are these? I suggest that an interlocutor 
who can act as a counterinstance to an exacerbating bias is one who respects a person when 
engaging in disagreement with her. That is, he treats her as valuable in accord with her status 
as a person, a Kantian end in herself.35 Respect, when manifested in foundational-worldview 
disagreements about public policy (or other sensitive matters), can help mitigate the 
exacerbation worry.36  
 
How does respect do this? Being (and feeling) respected can put interlocutors at their ease. 
Treating someone respectfully signals that you are on his side and willing to take him 
seriously. This influences his negative biases to weaken against you, mitigating the 
exacerbation worry insofar as this is caused by biases against perceived threats to his 
foundational worldview and public-policy beliefs. 
 
Mutual respect, then, helps foundational-worldview disagreement about public policy yield 
epistemic benefits. One way in which it does so is by making it easier for your interlocutor to 
respect you in turn, which will help you combat your biases against her. And mutual respect 
influences each interlocutor’s perception and interpretation of the other to be more accurate. 
How? If your bias de-escalates, you will be less apt to perceive and interpret your interlocutor 
through its distorting lens; this will make room to perceive and interpret her as she is, in all 
her realistic nuance. This will put you in a better position to gain the epistemic benefits that 
disagreement with her can make available.  
 
This includes engaging constructively with and learning from each other specifically on 
matters of public policy. The improved perception and interpretation made possible by respect 
will help each party better understand the other’s public-policy needs and values. Supposing 
that your interlocutor’s public-policy beliefs are reasonable from the standpoint of her needs 
and values, you will be in a better position to see for yourself how this is so.37 The better the 
interlocutors understand each other’s needs and values, the better a position each party will be 
in to think creatively with the other about the best public policy for their shared society.  
 
In summary, engaging in disagreement in general has the potential to mitigate the circularity 
and distortion worries, by providing external criticism of your belief system, expanding your 
evidential basis, and providing epistemic alternatives. And engaging specifically in 
foundational-worldview disagreement about public policy – assuming the parties are 
respectful – has the potential to mitigate the exacerbation worry, by enhancing the accuracy of 
each party’s perception and interpretation of the other.  
 
 
The Objection from True Foundational-Worldview Beliefs 
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Politically active religious communities might grant that the plural-discourse claim applies 
sometimes. But they may deny that it applies to themselves or to anyone else reasoning from 
their foundational worldview. For the beliefs contained in their foundational worldview, they 
will say, are true on the whole; all one need do is figure out their public-policy consequences. 
Moreover, people who do not subscribe to their foundational worldview are missing 
something crucial; so insofar as their public-policy opinions diverge from those of the 
community’s in question, these opinions will likely just mislead or confuse. As for 
information about the public-policy needs of people belonging to other social locations, this 
can be had by asking them. Nothing as involving as disagreement about how to translate these 
needs into public-policy ends, or about the means for achieving these ends, is needed.  
 
One response is to question whether a religious community can so easily identify its 
foundational-worldview beliefs to begin with in a way that is specific enough for them to 
serve as premises for public-policy reasoning as the objector envisions. For worldview beliefs 
(like any beliefs) come hand in hand with auxiliary beliefs and concepts, not least, for 
example, about the interpretation of scripture and tradition; as well as values. To the extent 
that the community’s foundational worldview itself remains up for grabs, it cannot provide a 
determinate bedrock from which to reason about public policy.  
 
But even supposing that a maximally specific interpretation can be found, an important 
problem looms: Foundational-worldview beliefs significantly underdetermine public policy. 
In other words, there are multiple public-policy positions that are compatible with any given 
set of such beliefs. The reason is simply that foundational-worldview beliefs, concepts, and 
values are silent on many matters of relevance to public policy.38 The adherents of the 
foundational worldview must supplement their worldview belief system with a public-policy 
belief system: a set of beliefs, concepts, and values concerning public policy itself, which 
concern matters that extend beyond a foundational worldview. 
 
Start with beliefs. We need empirical beliefs about cause and effect, e.g., whether a three-
strikes policy will reduce crime rates. We need theoretical beliefs about explanatory 
principles, e.g., whether, in explaining a social phenomenon like poverty, simple explanations 
that focus on individual actors are better than complex ones that also bring in social, 
economic and historical factors. We need beliefs about how a given phenomenon is best 
measured statistically, about which corollary effects a given policy will have, and so forth. 
Matters such as these are not determined by foundational-worldview belief systems, no matter 
how specific the latter are. 
 
A similar point holds for concepts. There are manifold concepts that are relevant to public 
policy yet that play no role in foundational worldviews. Concepts are relevant to our 
descriptions of ends and means. Take for example the concept of unemployment.39 One might 
define an unemployed person as one who is not engaging in full-time paid work and is 
actively seeking such work; the idea would be to isolate a category that exerts downward 
pressure on wage rates.40 But this concept – once regarded as standard – ignores people who 
are not in full-time paid work and who (say because of discouragement) have given up the 
search; it thus ignores other important phenomena related to joblessness, such as divorce 
rates, mental illness, and so forth. Concepts can also affect the value that we assign to the 
public-policy means and ends under discussion. For example, whether we conceptualize 
prostitution as immorality, victimhood, or entrepreneurship affects whether we value polices 
for jailing, rehabilitating, or taxing prostitutes. And whether we conceptualize social welfare 
as a human right as opposed to a kind of charity41 may affect how we value a policy of 
leaving its provision to individuals or mandating its provision by the state. Yet not even a 
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highly specific worldview belief system can determine a preference between one or another of 
these and other concepts. 
 
Finally, there are values of relevance to public policy. Should we value an outcome in which 
abortion is illegal, even if it is also one in which an industry of dangerous backstreet abortions 
thrives? Should we value the provision of jobs and the boosting of the oil economy (and the 
enhancements in economic wellbeing that this may bring about) over the religious freedom of 
First Nations whose sacred land would thereby be violated? There are many public-policy 
related values that a specific worldview belief system will leave underdetermined: One could 
argue in different ways from it. 
 
The need for a public-policy belief system in addition to the foundational worldview is a 
problem for the member of the politically active religious community I have in mind. To see 
why, recall her motivation in suppressing foundational-worldview disagreement to begin 
with: She takes her foundational-worldview beliefs to be true, and her concepts, and values 
accurate or fitted to purpose; she thus regards those which are incompatible with hers as false, 
inaccurate, and unfit to purposes. But since her religious beliefs, concepts and values do not 
suffice to determine public-policy positions, she will have to supplement them with beliefs, 
concepts, and values that cannot remotely be argued to follow from their worldview beliefs. 
Moreover, she will need to do more than simply figure out which public-policy belief system 
is compatible with her worldview-belief system, for there will be multiple compatible ones to 
choose from. So even if her worldview beliefs are true (and her concepts apt, and her values 
maximally specified), the advantages that this brings fall short of what is needed to guarantee 
an optimal public policy in the circumstances. This means that the adherents of foundational 
worldviews, even if largely true, are stuck reasoning about public-policy matters from 
considerations that might be false, just like anyone else.  
 
But if this is so, then the accuracy of one’s foundational worldview provides no reason to 
eschew open discussion about public-policy matters. On the contrary: Pace the objector, my 
arguments from section 3 apply here. In order to avoid the perils of circularity and distortion, 
which are exacerbated in our thinking about public policy and foundational worldviews, even 
the adherent of true foundational-worldview beliefs should engage in disagreement over 
public policy with people from differing religious and secular traditions. Disagreeing 
interlocutors can offer constructive criticism of the worldview adherents’ reasoning about 
public policy; they can offer additional evidence about public policy; and they can provide 
alternative viewpoints and patterns of reasoning on public policy. They can also – in the 
context of a relationship of mutual respect – offer counterexamples that help de-fuse one’s 
biases against things that strike one as incompatible with one’s foundational worldview. 
Moreover, none of this requires changing the community’s foundational worldview.  
 
The objector might still resist my conclusion. She may argue that, instead of engaging in 
foundational-worldview disagreement, her community should simply draw on its own public-
policy experts. They will see the world through the perspective of the right foundational 
worldview, and they will know how to apply it; disagreement with outsiders is not needed 
after all. In response, securing the opinions of community experts is surely epistemically 
advisable; it is also important for the sake of being true to one’s values. But it is still 
advisable, on top of this, to solicit the opinions of outside experts. For even though 
community experts will know about the public-policy matters on which their opinions are 
needed, they will be susceptible to groupthink effects arising with fellow community 
members. Some of this groupthink might be truth-sensitive, but, since the worldview beliefs 
themselves underdetermine public-policy thinking, there is little reason to expect it to be 
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truth-sensitive on public policy. And to the extent that it is, false-positive beliefs will still 
creep in. It is thus epistemically better to call on experts from all manner of religious and 
secular traditions to engage in foundational-worldview disagreement with each other. 
 
Finally, a response to the paternalism in the attitude of the politically active religious 
community I have in mind. This paternalism takes two forms. The first arises in the idea that a 
religious policymaker need not engage in public-policy disagreement with occupants of 
various social locations, but can simply ask them what their needs are. The idea would be that 
she would determine, herself, which ends must be achieved in order to meet those needs, and 
which means are best suited to achieving those ends. In response, it should be clear by now 
that this suggestion, even apart from its problematic paternalism, is unworkable. I have argued 
that a foundational-worldview belief system is insufficient to achieve the epistemic aim of 
public-policy reasoning; a fortiori, it is all the less sufficient to achieve this aim on the highly 
specialized matter of meeting the needs of a socially situated group to which one does not 
belong. Surely members of that group should be included among the parties to the debate.42  
 
The second form of paternalism goes a level deeper; it involves thinking that you know better 
than another group what their needs are to begin with – and that this is why engaging in 
disagreement with them will not help you legislate for them. My argument thus far furnishes 
two responses to this attitude. First, the circularity, distortion, and exacerbation worries give 
serious cause to doubt that we are often in a position to judge what others’ needs are better 
than they themselves.  
 
Second, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that one can sometimes – though rarely – 
be in such a position, for human flourishing has an objective component that other people 
may be in a better position to gauge than oneself. For example, it is possible to know better 
than a drug addict, whose judgment is sadly clouded, what is good for him (namely, not 
getting his fix). But even in rare cases like this, there is no reason to discount the views of 
others – such as addicts – in legislating how best to help them. On the contrary: There is 
positive reason to engage his disagreement about the matter. For the addict himself offers a 
unique viewpoint on how he (and those like him) wind up addicted, and on what factors 
would help him (and others) overcome their addictions.  
 
The addict example does not involve foundational-worldview disagreement. But consider an 
example that does, involving the abortion debate. To oversimplify, imagine that a secular 
community argues on secular grounds that abortion does not amount to murder, whereas a 
religious community argues on religious grounds that it does. Suppose for the sake of the 
example that the religious group happens to be correct about this. If this is so, it is also 
reasonable to argue that abortion should strongly be discouraged – because of the intrinsic 
human value of the foetus, and because it is an act of mercy to strongly discourage someone 
from bringing guilt upon herself. However, even if all this is true, it delivers more reason, not 
less, to engage in disagreement with those who argue for secular reasons that abortion does 
not amount to murder. Supposing that the latter cannot be convinced, the next-best option is 
to hear them out on what they dislike about the religious group’s public-policy 
recommendations, and on what they would recommend instead that would discourage people 
from having abortions. Ideas for the sake of illustration include various forms of practical, 
financial, social, legal, and psychological support for women who find themselves in difficult 
situations with unwanted pregnancies, to ensure that alternative options are at least as easy as 
an abortion itself would be. The best way to acquire such ideas, however, is to engage in 
disagreement, in this case foundational-worldview disagreement, about how to discourage 
abortion. 
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In summary, one cannot derive public policy from a worldview belief system alone – one 
must supplement it with a belief system about public policy, and this is best done by engaging 
in, or having community experts engage in, foundational-worldview disagreement about 
public policy. This also applies in cases in which politically active religious policymakers 
might naturally tend to paternalistically discourage disagreement instead. 
 
 
The Objection from Properly Functioning Religious-Cognitive Faculties  
 
The representative of the politically active religious community may have another objection. 
His community’s cognition, he will say, is powered by divine inspiration, and this ensures 
that the community’s internal discussion of public policy will yield true beliefs on this matter, 
as well as concepts and values that are fit to purpose.  
 
We cannot discuss all accounts of divine cognitive inspiration, so I will limit myself to the 
influential “sensus divinitatis” account developed by Alvin Plantinga.43 The sensus divinitatis 
is a cognitive faculty; it resembles a mechanism of sense perception in that it uptakes 
information from the person’s environment. But instead of yielding sensory experiences, it 
yields experiences of God’s traces in the world, including accurate intellectual seemings 
concerning religious matters,44 so that beliefs based on them are apt to be true. Plantinga says 
that, due to the noetic effects of sin, everyone comes into the world with a malfunctioning 
sensus divinitatis,45 rendering it epistemically unreliable. But he adds that the Holy Spirit 
repairs the sensus divinitatis of certain people, who are then equipped to perceive religious 
aspects of reality and on that basis form true religious beliefs.46 We may understand the 
objection, then, as the claim that each member of the objector’s community has a properly 
functioning sensus divinitatis; this means, says the objector, that the community’s public-
policy reasoning is apt to be reliable as it stands – so engaging in foundational-worldview 
disagreement is otiose at best. 
 
This move, however, cannot vindicate politically active religious communities in suppressing 
foundational-worldview disagreement about public policy. For on any reasonable construal of 
the sensus divinitatis, this faculty does not help believers reason well about public policy in 
general. Its remit is to enable them to perceive religious aspects of reality, and as we saw in 
section 4, any insights that one might have into religious reality drastically underdetermine 
public policy.47 
 
But even though a sensus divinitatis does not help believers reason well about public policy in 
general, it can help them in one sort of situation: when they are engaging in foundational-
worldview disagreement about it. In other words, if there is such a thing as a sensus 
divinitatis, this faculty could help its possessors use foundational-worldview disagreement 
about public policy as an epistemic tool. But for this to happen, they would have to engage in 
such disagreement after all, vindicating the plural-discourse claim. 
 
My argument can be summarized like this: We saw that a properly functioning sensus 
divinitatis, if there is such a thing, helps a person perceive religious aspects of reality. This 
means that, if engaging with a disagreeing interlocutor about public policy has any religious 
dimensions, the person with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis will be in a good place 
to cognize them. I claim that, supposing that there is a religious reality, foundational-
worldview disagreement about public policy does have religious dimensions – and that 
perceiving them can yield insight about public policy. 
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To see the religious dimension of foundational-worldview disagreement, note that a 
disagreeing interlocutor is a person, and personhood is a religiously significant aspect of 
reality. Think of Jesus saying in Matthew’s Gospel that what you have done unto the least of 
these people, you have done unto him.48 Think also of Mother Teresa who, in her 
posthumously published letters, reveals that she felt Christ’s presence the most strongly in the 
people to whom she was ministering.49  It is a common religious idea that God made human 
beings in his image. So supposing that this sort of religious worldview is accurate (as the 
objector presumably takes it to be), personhood has a sacred value that is of a piece with the 
value of God himself. And if this is so, a properly functioning sensus divinitatis can help you 
perceive this sacred value in persons – that is, to see persons as valuable, indeed sacred.  
 
So there is a religious dimension to foundational-worldview disagreement. Can perceiving it 
yield insights about public policy? I propose that it can. To see how, recall from the 
subsection “A third epistemic worry mitigated by foundational-worldview disagreement” that 
foundational-worldview disagreement must, if the exacerbation worry is to be overcome, be 
carried out with mutual respect. I suggest that a properly functioning sensus divinitatis, 
supposing that there is such a thing, can help cultivate respect. After all, it helps you perceive 
your interlocutors as made in the image of God and hence deserving of infinite respect; this 
can surely motivate you to respond by respecting them.50 So a properly functioning sensus 
divinitatis, far from making foundational-worldview disagreement about public policy 
unnecessary, can promote the respect that helps this sort of disagreement secure the epistemic 
benefits on matters of public policy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that foundational-worldview disagreement over public policy has the strong 
potential to be epistemically beneficial. Discoursing over public policy with adherents of 
other religious or secular belief systems can combat the psychological and social pressures, 
including groupthink effects, that make us prone to seeing the world through the limited lens 
of those who think as we do. As such it is a powerful tool for obtaining constructive criticism, 
gaining new evidence, and seeing new epistemic alternatives. And combined with mutual 
respect, foundational-worldview disagreement can also help overcome epistemically 
detrimental biases that would otherwise attach to interlocutors who disagree with us about 
sensitive matters like religion and public policy. 
 
My argument delivers a strong epistemological reason to reject the position of the politically 
active religious community whose aim is to suppress public-policy discussion with those 
outside of its narrow sphere. Recall that this community is motivated in part by the epistemic 
concern of ensuring that the public-policy insights of their own religious worldview not be 
diluted by “worldly” considerations. I have argued, on the contrary, that true religious beliefs 
are not guaranteed to deliver good public policy, since public policy concerns matters that 
stretch far beyond the religious domain. I have also argued that the appeal to divine cognitive 
aid speaks for engaging in foundational-worldview disagreement over public policy, not 
against it.51  
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